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I. INTRODUCTION 
City of Norwood v. Horney,
1
 a unanimous opinion authored by 
 
* The author of this Article, Kathleen M. Trafford, is a partner at Porter, Wright, Morris, & Arthur, 
LLP and chairs its Appellate and Ohio Supreme Court Practice Group. She is a Fellow of the 
American College of Trial Lawyers and a past president of the Columbus Bar Association. She 
attended the University of Akron School of Law for two years and received her juris doctorate from 
Capital University School of Law in 1979. 
 1.  City of Norwood v. Horney (“Norwood”), 110 Ohio St. 3d 353, 2006-Ohio-3799, 853 
1
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Chief Justice Maureen O’Connor in 2006, is well known for its holdings 
on eminent domain. But, as important as its eminent domain holdings 
are, there is much more to the Norwood opinion. Indeed, Norwood is 
every bit as important for its articulation of fundamental principles 
governing the constitutional role of the judiciary in modern times. 
Norwood recalibrates the balance thought to be struck in the Ohio 
Constitution between an individual’s inalienable right to acquire and 
possess property and the need to protect the public welfare.
2
 It does so 
by declaring that “economic or financial benefit alone is insufficient to 
satisfy the public use requirement” established in article I, section 19 of 
the Ohio Constitution and that “any taking based solely on financial gain 
is void as a matter of law.”3 This holding tips the scale toward giving 
broader protection to individual property rights after several decades of 
case law allowing greater latitude for governmental takings. The Ohio 
Supreme Court’s holding concerned a significant point of law rendered 
early in the legal, social, and cultural debates over the use of eminent 
domain to seize property so that it could be transformed into a more 
lucrative tax base. However, the broader significance of Norwood lies in 
its discussion of three important principles that the Court reaffirmed and 
sharpened before reaching its holding on takings. 
First, Norwood followed closely on the heels of Kelo v. New 
London,
4
 in which the United States Supreme Court upheld a taking of 
individual property for purely economic reasons
5
 as not violative of the 
federal Fifth Amendment.
6
 The Ohio Supreme Court, however, was not 
cowed by the High Court’s ruling nor persuaded by its analysis. By 
breaking company with the United States Supreme Court and grounding 
its analysis almost exclusively on the Ohio Constitution and Ohio 
 
N.E.2d 1115. 
 2.  OHIO CONST. art. I, § 1 states: “All men . . . have certain inalienable rights, among which 
are those of . . . acquiring, possessing and protecting property.” OHIO CONST. art. I, § 19 states:  
Private property shall ever be held inviolate, but subservient to the public welfare. When 
taken in time of war or other public exigency, imperatively requiring its immediate sei-
zure or for the purpose of making or repairing roads, which shall be open to the public, 
without charge, a compensation shall be made to the owner, in money, and in all other 
cases, where private property shall be taken for public use, a compensation therefor shall 
first be made in money, or first secured by a deposit of money; and such compensation 
shall be assessed by a jury, without deduction for benefits to any property of the owner. 
 3.  Norwood, 2006-Ohio-3799 at ¶ 80. 
 4.  Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
 5.  Id. at 485. 
 6.  “No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; 
nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” U.S. CONST. amend. 
V. 
2
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values
7
, the Court took a step forward in establishing the principle of 
Ohio constitutional independence and moving the Court more solidly 
into the New Judicial Federalism camp.
8
 
Second, the Court made clear, in no uncertain terms, that the 
determination of what constitutes a “public use” for purposes of an Ohio 
takings clause analysis is a judicial question.
9
 While acknowledging that 
some deference to legislative findings is appropriate, the opinion leaves 
no doubt that judicial review of whether the public use requirement has 
been satisfied cannot be accomplished by “superficial scrutiny” or 
reduced to “hortatory fluff.”10 Norwood is, in this regard, an important 
separation-of-powers opinion that likely will affect how the Court 
balances legislative and judicial authority in areas other than eminent 
domain. 
Third, the Court breathed new life into the dormant, if not dead, 
void-for-vagueness doctrine. Norwood makes clear that the doctrine still 
has utility in eminent domain cases
11
 and suggests that it may have 
utility in other cases in which a civil statute affects fundamental 
constitutional rights.
12
 
This Article will argue that the Norwood opinion not only enhances 
the individual’s protection under Ohio’s eminent domain law but also 
refines the judiciary’s approach to Ohio constitutional analysis. Part I 
will set forth the pre-Norwood standard of review in Ohio eminent 
domain law, which took an increasingly expansive approach to 
determining what constitutes public use out of deference to the 
legislature. It will outline the standard of review for eminent domain 
cases at the federal level following the United States Supreme Court’s 
holding in Kelo, which upheld the taking of private property for purely 
economic reasons. Finally, Part I discusses the facts and holding of 
Norwood, which struck down the taking of private property for purely 
 
 7.  Norwood, 2006-Ohio-3799 at ¶ 9. 
 8.  “New Judicial Federalism” refers to a movement that emerged in the 1970s advocating 
the “renewed reliance by state courts on state constitutions as independent sources of constitutional 
rights, often with the aim of extending greater protection to individual liberties than is available 
under current interpretations of the federal constitution.” Mary Cornelia Porter & G. Alan Tarr, The 
New Judicial Federalism and the Ohio Supreme Court: Anatomy of a Failure, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 143, 
143 (1984); see also Robert F. Williams, The New Judicial Federalism in Ohio: The First Decade, 
51 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 415, 423 (2004); Richard A. Saphire, Ohio Constitutional Interpretation, 51 
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 437, 443 (2004); Marianna Brown Bettman, Ohio Joins the New Judicial 
Federalism Movement: A Little To-ing and a Little Fro-ing, 51 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 491, 491 (2004). 
 9.  Norwood, 2006-Ohio-3799 at ¶ 67. 
 10.  Id. at ¶ 66. 
 11.  Id. at ¶ 88. 
 12.  Id. 
3
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economic reasons on the authority of the Ohio Constitution. Part II will 
explore how the Norwood opinion exemplifies Ohio constitutional 
independence and New Judicial Federalism by grounding its analysis in 
the Ohio Constitution and departing from the federal paradigm. Part III 
will consider how Norwood affects judicial deference to legislative 
authority, given the fine line between judicial deference and judicial 
abdication and the Court’s emphasis on separation of powers. Finally, 
Part IV will discuss the legislative clarity required under Norwood’s use 
of the rarely invoked void-for-vagueness doctrine. 
II. ANALYSIS 
A. Norwood Rebalances the Takings Scale 
1. Pre-Norwood Standards of Review in Ohio Eminent Domain 
Law 
Two of the significant aspects of Norwood are its reliance on the 
protections within the Ohio Constitution, rather than federal 
constitutional protections,
13
 and Chief Justice O’Connor’s adamant 
insistence that judicial review of takings is commensurate with the 
fundamental right to property that is at issue in takings cases.
14
 Prior to 
Norwood, Ohio eminent domain law increasingly favored the legislative 
right to take private property for the “public welfare” by broadly 
expanding the notion of what constitutes a public use and giving 
increased deference to legislative determinations of public use. Three 
points along the continuum show this evolution of the law before 
Norwood brought it to its current state. 
In the early twentieth century case of Pontiac Improvement 
Company v. Board of Commissioners, the Ohio Supreme Court held that 
a public corporation could not use the power of eminent domain to assert 
regulatory control over private property in the absence of either a 
physical taking or compensation.
15
 The case came before the Court after 
the Cleveland Metropolitan Park District (District) successfully 
prosecuted an appropriation suit to acquire, in fee simple, a portion of an 
entire tract of private property and to assert ongoing control over the 
remainder of the property without further compensation.
16
 
 
 13.  Id. at ¶ 65. 
 14.  Id. at ¶ 69. 
 15.   Pontiac Improvement Co. v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 135 N.E. 635, 641 (Ohio 1922). 
 16.  Id. at 636. 
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The District’s goal was to build a park on the parcel acquired from 
the owner and create a park-like appearance on the adjacent parcel by 
asserting the right to control plantings, grading, and drainage on the 
property and the right to prevent the owner from placing buildings, 
fences, poles, signs, or other structures on the property.
17
 The District 
claimed it had the right to assert this type of regulatory taking because 
the Ohio Legislature had authorized metropolitan park boards to exercise 
the power of eminent domain to acquire not only fee interests but also 
“any lesser interest . . . as the board may deem advisable.”18 Both the 
trial court and the court of appeals found in favor of the District, but the 
Ohio Supreme Court reversed.
19
 
The Court strictly construed article I, section 19 of the Ohio 
Constitution, stating, “[i]t is very clear that the purpose of the 
constitution was to safeguard the rights of private property and to 
preserve it to the owner, except where it ‘shall be taken for a public 
use.’”20 The Court concluded that “[t]he natural import of the words, 
‘taken for public use,’ used in our constitution is that the thing is to be 
used by the public or by some agency of the public.”21 The Court found 
that the phrase, “taken for public use,” “implies possession, occupation 
and enjoyment of the property by the public, or by public agencies, to be 
used for public purposes.”22 Although the Court’s analysis was 
predominantly textual and focused on interpreting the phrase, “taken for 
a public use,” the Court was not inattentive to the property owner’s 
interests. Indeed, the Court expressed a genuine concern that allowing 
the type of indefinite, uncompensated regulatory takings intended by the 
District left too much uncertainty and confusion regarding the property 
owner’s ongoing rights and privileges.23 
 
 17.  Id. at 637-38. 
 18.  Id. at 637. 
 19.  Id. at 641. 
 20.  Id. at 638. While the prefatory sentence in article I, section 19 places private property 
“subservient to the public welfare,” the “taken for a public use” language was added as a result of 
the amendment to the Ohio Constitution in 1891 that describes how compensation is to be 
determined and paid when the power of eminent domain is exercised. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id. at 635. The Court acknowledged that, under the weight of existing judicial authority, a 
taking may be made by a private entity to serve the public with some necessity or convenience, or 
even by a private individual to enable him or her to cultivate the land or carry on a business that 
could not otherwise be done. However, it held that in all such instances, there must be “an actual 
taking of the land, or an acquisition of an easement in the land, a going upon and acquiring either a 
fee or lesser interest.” Id. at 639. 
 23.  Id. at 640 (“It does not appear that any provision has been made concerning the method 
of exercising these rights to control, regulate and prevent the various matters stated in the petition, 
nor does it appear how they are to be enforced, nor how often they may be altered, nor what notice 
5
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The Court’s strict interpretation of article I, section 19 to require an 
actual taking for a public use, however, did not withstand the test of 
time. Three decades later, in State ex rel. Bruestle v. Rich, the Court 
overruled that branch of the Pontiac Improvement holding
24
 and 
substituted a broad interpretation of the government’s eminent domain 
power for an interpretation that was more protective of individuals’ 
property rights.
25
 
The issue in Bruestle was whether the taking of property for urban 
redevelopment is a public use for which the power of eminent domain 
may be exercised.
26
 The redevelopment plan at issue contemplated the 
use of eminent domain power by a city to acquire all the property in a 
blighted area for the purpose of demolishing existing buildings and 
reselling the property to private developers for redevelopment.
27
 The 
plan envisioned continuing restrictions on the redevelopment effort to 
guard against the recurrence of blight.
28
 
The Court rejected the argument that the constitutional “public use” 
requirement meant “there must be a use or right of use on the part of the 
public or some limited portion thereof,” finding that such an argument 
ignored the first sentence of article I, section 19 of the Ohio 
Constitution, which renders private property “subservient to the public 
welfare.”29 The Court held that property taken for the public welfare is 
property taken for a public use, even when there may be an incidental 
nonpublic use of the property or benefit of the taking.
30
 The Court 
summarily dismissed the notion that the elimination of slums and 
initiation of provisions to guard against the recurrence of blight is not 
conducive to the public welfare.
31
 
Bruestle also sent a strong signal that, going forward, the Court 
would defer to legislative findings as to whether property was taken for 
 
must be given to the owner of the property who remains in possession, nor whether he shall have a 
right to be heard touching the various matters. The uncertainty, confusion and contention that would 
necessarily arise are very apparent”). 
 24.  State ex rel. Bruestle v. Rich, 110 N.E.2d 778, 780 (Ohio 1953). See also id. at 786 
(citing Pontiac Improvement Co., 135 N.E. at 635) (concluding that the syllabus of Pontiac 
Improvement Co. “appears to be contrary to the intention expressed by the people by the words used 
in Section 19 of Article I of the Constitution and inconsistent with other pronouncements of this 
court”). 
 25.  Id. at 787-88. 
 26.  Id. at 784. 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  Id. at 780-81. 
 29.  Id. at 785. 
 30.  Id. at 780. 
 31.  Id. at 787. 
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the public welfare and not overturn those determinations unless they 
were found to be “manifestly arbitrary and unreasonable” – the same 
level of deference applied to municipal spending decisions.
32
 Yet, by 
importing into the eminent domain context the test applied to municipal 
spending decisions,
33
 the Bruestle Court failed to acknowledge the 
critical difference between the power of eminent domain and the power 
to tax and spend: the former affects an inalienable right, while the latter 
does not.
34
 
The signal sent in Bruestle was amplified in AAAA Enterprises, Inc. 
v. River Place Community Urban Redevelopment Corp.
35
 There, the 
Court held that the abuse-of-discretion standard applies to judicial 
review of a legislative determination that an area is a “blighted area” 
appropriate for exercise of the power of eminent domain.
36
 The Court 
rejected the view that to satisfy that standard the property owner must 
come forward with evidence of subjective bad faith but, nevertheless, 
held that the property owner had to clear the high hurdle of showing that 
the legislative determination was “unreasonable, arbitrary or 
unconscionable.”37 Even this modified abuse-of-discretion standard, 
however, gives inordinate weight to the legislative public-welfare 
determination and significantly discounts the value of the inalienable 
right to acquire, possess, and protect private property. The standard 
invoked in AAAA Enterprises is routinely and appropriately applied to 
any number of discretionary governmental decisions that do not invade 
fundamental constitutional rights.
38
 Where governmental action invades 
a fundamental right, however, the courts have typically applied a 
heightened standard of review.
39
 
 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Id. (citing State ex rel. Gordon v. Rhodes, 100 N.E.2d 225 (Ohio 1951)). 
 34.  Article 1, section 1 of the Ohio Constitution deems the acquisition, possession, and 
protection of property an “inalienable” right. Similarly, the Norwood opinion characterizes property 
rights as “fundamental.” See Norwood, 110 Ohio St. 3d 353, 2006-Ohio-3799, 853 N.E.2d 1115, at 
¶ 38; see also note 65 infra and accompanying text. 
 35.  AAAA Enter., Inc. v. River Place Cmty Urban Redevelopment Corp., 553 N.E.2d 597 
(Ohio 1990). 
 36.  Id. at 600. 
 37.  Id. at 601. 
 38.  See, e.g., State v. Schreckengost, 282 N.E.2d 50, 53 (Ohio 1972) (noting that an abuse-
of-discretion standard applied to the state legislature’s decision to vest authority in the Division of 
Parks and Recreation to create regulations to govern parks without providing guidelines for such 
regulations). 
 39.  See generally State v. Burnett, 755 N.E.2d 857, 865 (Ohio 2001) (Cook, J., concurring). 
Legislation that affects a fundamental right is generally subject to strict scrutiny; that is, it “must be 
narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest.” Id. at 866 (citing Reno v. Flores, 
507 U.S. 292, 301-02 (1993)). 
7
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The Court’s increasing willingness to defer to the legislature 
mirrored the progression of federal eminent domain law.
40
 Federal courts 
also deferred to the legislature, noting that the role of the judiciary in 
reviewing legislative findings is “an extremely narrow one”41 and that 
courts should “not substitute its judgment for a legislature’s judgment as 
to what constitutes a public use ‘unless the use be palpably without 
reasonable foundation.’”42 
2. Standards of Review in Federal Eminent Domain Law 
The consequences of lowering the bar for judicial review in 
eminent domain cases were dramatically brought home in Kelo v. New 
London, decided by a sharply divided United States Supreme Court 
merely six months before Norwood was argued before the Ohio Supreme 
Court.
43
 Kelo put forth the issue of whether a municipality could take 
unblighted private property solely for the purpose of economic 
development
44
 – the same issue that the Court would take up in 
Norwood.
45
 
The economically distressed city of New London adopted a 
comprehensive development plan projected to create jobs, increase 
revenue, and substantially revitalize the development area, which 
included downtown and waterfront areas on the Long Island Sound in 
southern Connecticut.
46
 In order to implement the plan, the city 
reactivated the New London Development Corporation, a private 
nonprofit entity, and authorized it to acquire property in the 90-acre 
development area by purchase or eminent domain.
47
 Owners of 15 of the 
properties in the area refused to sell their homes or businesses – none of 
which were blighted or in poor condition – and challenged the city’s 
delegation of eminent domain power to the private corporation on the 
 
 40.  See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 482 (2005) (noting federal precedent had 
developed a deferential approach to legislative determinations in this area).  
 41.  Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954). 
 42.  Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984) (quoting United States v. 
Gettysburg Elec. Ry. Co., 160 U.S. 668, 680 (1896)). 
 43.  Norwood was first argued on September 28, 2005, with argument limited to the 
constitutionality of the provision in R.C. 163.19 prohibiting courts from enjoining an appropriation 
after compensation for the property is deposited with the court but prior to appellate review. On 
January 11, 2006, the Court heard argument on the broader issue of the constitutionality of taking 
private property by eminent domain and transferring the property to a private entity for 
redevelopment. 
 44.  Kelo, 545 U.S. at 477. 
 45.  Norwood, 110 Ohio St. 3d 353, 2006-Ohio-3799, 853 N.E.2d 1115, at ¶ 7. 
 46.  Kelo, 545 U.S. at 472. 
 47.  Id. at 473-75. 
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ground that taking private property for the purpose of economic 
development violated the public use restriction in the Fifth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution.
48
 
The Court declined the petitioners’ invitation to adopt a bright-line 
rule that economic development does not qualify as a public use, 
invoking the Court’s long-standing deference to legislative 
determinations of which public needs justify the use of the takings 
power and its own traditionally broad understanding of public purpose to 
find that the “plan unquestionably serves a public purpose.”49 While the 
majority believed its holding was readily predictable from over a century 
of Supreme Court case law interpreting the Takings Clause,
50
 the four 
dissenters found it an astonishing abandonment of “long-held, basic 
limitations on governmental power” that effectively deleted the public 
use requirement from the federal Takings Clause.
51
 The four dissenting 
justices read the majority’s opinion as making all private property 
vulnerable to being taken and transferred to another private owner, 
simply because it might be upgraded in a manner that a legislative body 
deems more beneficial to the public.
52
 
Kelo provoked caustic criticism and debate about eminent domain 
abuse and was a call to action for state legislatures and courts across the 
country.
53
 Ohio was poised to enter the post-Kelo arena because the 
Ohio Supreme Court had already accepted Norwood for review. 
3. Setting the Stage for Constitutional Consideration 
Norwood, an island completely surrounded by the city of 
Cincinnati, was a thriving city with a strong industrial base and 
desirable, low-density residential communities until the late 1960s when 
the city was transected by construction of Interstate 71 (I-71).
54
 The I-71 
construction truncated numerous residential streets, eliminated houses, 
and changed the character of many neighborhoods, including the area in 
the vicinity of Madison and Edwards Roads where the Horneys and their 
neighbors lived.
55
 This later became the Edwards Road Urban Renewal 
 
 48.  Id. at 469. 
 49.  Id. at 484. 
 50.  Id. at 490. 
 51.  Id. at 494. 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  Julia D. Mahony, Kelo’s Legacy: Eminent Domain and the Forfeiture of Property Rights, 
2005 SUP. CT. REV. 103, 104 (2006). 
 54.  City of Norwood v. Horney (“Norwood II”), 161 Ohio App. 3d 316, 2005-Ohio-2448, 
830 N.E.2d 381, at ¶¶ 7-8. 
 55.  Id. 
9
Trafford: Much More Than Eminent Domain
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2015
44 AKRON LAW REVIEW [48:35 
 
Area.
56
 
In 2002, a private developer approached the city of Norwood (City) 
and proposed to redevelop the area into a conglomerate of higher density 
residential areas, retail and office spaces, and large public parking 
facilities.
57
 The City supported the redevelopment proposal but declined 
to use its power of eminent domain to assist the developer in acquiring 
the properties to be redeveloped.
58
 
Subsequently, the developer successfully acquired all but five of the 
necessary parcels and renewed its plea to the City to acquire the 
remaining properties through appropriation.
59
 The City acquiesced, 
commissioning an urban renewal study to determine whether the area 
that included the properties to be acquired was a “‘slum, blighted, or 
deteriorated’ or ‘deteriorating’” as required by statute.60 The study 
concluded that the construction of I-71 and resulting commercialization 
of the area had a negative effect on the area as a residential community 
and that piecemeal redevelopment was likely to occur, which would 
have an “adverse effect on the physical, aesthetic, and functional 
qualities of the area.”61 
In August 2003, the Norwood City Council passed an ordinance “to 
eliminate deteriorating and deteriorated areas within the City of 
Norwood and to improve safety and traffic conditions and other 
deteriorating conditions” by “encouraging their prompt redevelopment” 
along with a companion ordinance authorizing the mayor to contract 
with the private developer for the redevelopment of the area.
62
 The 
following month, City Council authorized the use of the power of 
eminent domain to acquire the remaining parcels owned by the Horneys 
and their neighbors.
63
 
In the appropriation cases that followed, the property owners 
asserted the City had abused its discretion in determining that the 
renewal area was a “deteriorating” area over which the power of eminent 
domain could be lawfully exercised.
64
 The trial court disagreed, 
approved the appropriation of the properties, and declined to enjoin the 
 
 56.  Id.; Norwood, 110 Ohio St. 3d 353, 2006-Ohio-3799, 853 N.E.2d 1115, at ¶ 14. 
 57.  Norwood II, 2005-Ohio-2448 at ¶ 9. 
 58.  Id. at ¶ 10. 
 59.  Id. at ¶ 11. 
 60.  Id. at ¶ 11. 
 61.  Id. at ¶ 12. 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  Id. at ¶¶ 2-3. 
 64.  Id. at ¶ 5. 
10
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developer from using or destroying the properties pending appeal.
65
 
In May 2005, the First District Court of Appeals affirmed. Both the 
trial court and the court of appeals felt constrained to uphold City 
Council’s determination that the area was “deteriorating” by the 
deference required to be given such legislative judgments under prior 
precedent.
66
 The court of appeals read AAAA Enterprises as requiring the 
court to “give the definition of ‘blighted area’ a liberal interpretation” 
and believed its “role in determining whether governmental power has 
been exercised for a public purpose is an extremely narrow one.”67 The 
court of appeals understood AAAA Enterprises and Bruestle as broadly 
holding “that a taking under an urban renewal plan is for a valid public 
purpose and is constitutional.”68 
4. The Norwood Decision 
The Ohio Supreme Court unanimously disagreed with the court of 
appeals’ reading of its precedents as well as the result on the merits.69 
The Norwood decision assures that, in Ohio, property owners do not 
have to live under the Kelo threat that their homes or other property can 
be taken simply because some other party might put the property to a 
“better” use that conceivably furthers the “public welfare.” 
Chief Justice O’Connor’s opinion for the Court explained, citing 
150 years of precedent, that “Ohio has always considered the right of 
property to be a fundamental right” and that “the bundle of venerable 
rights associated with property is strongly protected by the Ohio 
Constitution and must be trod upon lightly no matter how great the 
weight of other forces.”70 The Court acknowledged that the concept of 
 
 65.  Norwood, 110 Ohio St. 3d 353, 2006-Ohio-3799, 853 N.E.2d 1115, at ¶ 31. The court of 
appeals also denied a stay, finding that R.C. 163.19 prohibited such relief. The Ohio Supreme Court 
issued an order on February 22, 2005, enjoining any further destruction or alteration of the 
properties pending the appeal on the merits. City of Norwood v. Horney, 105 Ohio St. 3d 1445, 
2005-Ohio-669, 822 N.E.2d 1261. The Court ultimately held the anti-injunction provision in R.C. 
169.13 unconstitutional as an infringement on inherent judicial authority. Norwood, 2006-Ohio-
3799 at ¶ 123. 
 66.  Norwood, 2006-Ohio-3799 at ¶ 26 (quoting trial court opinion); see also Norwood II, 
2005-Ohio-2448 at ¶¶ 27-28. 
 67. Norwood II, 2005-Ohio-2448 at ¶ 31. 
 68.  Id. at ¶ 44. 
 69.  Norwood, 2006-Ohio-3799 at ¶ 63. 
 70.  Id. at ¶ 38 (citing Reece v. Kyle, 31 N.E. 747, 750 (Ohio 1892), overruled in part on 
other grounds; Mahoning Cty. Bar Ass’n v. Ruffalo, 199 N.E.2d 396 (Ohio 1964); Hatch v. 
Buckeye State Bldg. & Loan Co., 16 Ohio Law Abs. 661 (1934); In re Vine St. Congregational 
Church, 20 Ohio Dec. 573 (1910); Caldwell v. Baltimore & Ohio Ry. Co., 14 Ohio Dec. 375 
(1904); Kata v. Second Nat’l Bank of Warren, 271 N.E.2d 292 (Ohio 1971)). 
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public use had evolved into a broad and flexible standard, exemplified 
by its holding in Bruestle that “a taking of blighted property for purposes 
of redevelopment was within the broad and inclusive concept of public 
use.”71 The Court, however, saw two critical distinctions in the case 
before it: (1) the properties were not blighted, and (2) the contemplated 
use of the property was dependent upon a private party.
72
 These 
distinctions led the Court to define the issue before it as whether “an 
economic or financial benefit alone” is sufficient to satisfy the public use 
requirement of the Ohio Constitution; the Court then reached the swift, 
sure, and unanimous conclusion that it is not.
73
 
The Norwood decision rebalanced the takings scale by withdrawing 
the judicial thumb, placed there under prior law in the form of judicial 
deference, and by allowing the property owners’ pan to naturally weigh 
against the legislature’s pan. Nevertheless, as discussed below, Norwood 
has broad import well beyond its public use holding and is likely to 
affect the development of the law in other substantive areas. 
B. Norwood Invigorates the Court’s Commitment to Ohio 
Constitutional Independence 
Norwood has significance beyond its immediate holding because 
the Court takes an independent constitutional stance by rejecting Kelo 
and using the Ohio Constitution to safeguard individual property rights 
not recognized under federal law. It is one of only a few cases in which 
the Ohio Supreme Court has invoked state constitutional independence 
to reach an outcome different from federal law in a non-criminal case. 
Over the last 40 years, courts, judges, lawyers, and scholars have 
increasingly recognized the potential of state constitutions to provide 
greater protection for individual rights and liberties than the federal 
Constitution as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court. The 
birth of this “New Judicial Federalism” movement is traced to Justice 
William J. Brennan’s call to arms to cure what he saw as the 
depreciation of federal constitutional protections, particularly those 
protecting the rights of criminal defendants, due to the growing 
conservatism of the United States Supreme Court at that time.
74
 The 
 
 71.  Id. at ¶ 59. 
 72.  Id. at ¶¶ 62, 71. 
 73.  Id. at ¶ 80. 
 74.  See William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 
90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 491 (1977) (“State courts cannot rest when they have afforded their citizens 
the full protections of the federal Constitution. State constitutions, too, are a font of individual 
liberties, their protections often extending beyond those required by the Supreme Court’s 
12
Akron Law Review, Vol. 48 [2015], Iss. 1, Art. 3
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol48/iss1/3
2015] MUCH MORE THAN EMINENT DOMAIN 47 
 
movement, as matured over time, however, is not viewed as either 
“liberal” or “conservative” but rather as recognizing, appreciating, and 
advocating state constitutions as an independent source of fundamental 
law that can place a wide array of individual rights and liberties on a 
level higher than the federal constitutional floor.
75
 
Ohio officially joined the New Judicial Federalism movement in 
Arnold v. City of Cleveland, in which the Court was called on to decide 
the constitutionality of a municipal ordinance banning the possession 
and sale of assault weapons.
76
 Presumably, because the question whether 
individuals have a fundamental right to bear arms under the United 
States Constitution had already been decided in the negative,
77
 Arnold 
asserted that the ordinance violated the fundamental right to bear arms 
under article I, section 4 of the Ohio Constitution.
78
 The Court openly 
embraced the notion that it was free to interpret the Ohio Constitution – 
a document of “independent force” – to provide greater civil liberties 
and protections to individuals and groups than required by the federal 
constitutional “floor.”79 The Court analyzed the text of article I, section 4 
of the Ohio Constitution, contrasted it with the Second Amendment to 
the United States Constitution, and found the Ohio provision broader in 
that it “secures to every person a fundamental individual right to bear 
arms for ‘their defense and security.’”80 The Court held that the right to 
bear arms was a fundamental right under the Ohio Constitution, although 
not an absolute right.
81
 While the defendant in Arnold made the case for 
Ohio constitutional independence, he ultimately did not prevail, as the 
Court held that the ordinance was a proper exercise of the police power 
 
interpretation of federal law); Michigan v. Mosely, 423 U.S. 96, 121 (1975) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) (“[S]tate courts and legislatures are, as a matter of state law, increasingly according 
protections once provided as federal rights but now increasingly depreciated by decisions of this 
Court.”). 
 75.  See generally Robert F. Williams, Why State Constitutions Matter, 45 NEW ENG. L. REV. 
901 (2011); Jeffrey S. Sutton, Why Teach—and Why Study—State Constitutional Law, 34 OKLA. 
CITY U. L. REV. 165 (2009). 
 76.  Arnold v. City of Cleveland, 616 N.E.2d 163, 164 (Ohio 1993). Although Arnold 
represents the first overt statement of the New Judicial Federalism in Ohio law, the Ohio Supreme 
Court had, on several prior occasions, interpreted the Ohio constitutional provisions more broadly 
than their federal counterparts. See Preterm Cleveland v. Voinovich, 627 N.E.2d 570, 573-74 (Ohio 
Ct. App. 1993) (collecting cases). 
 77.  Arnold, 616 N.E.2d at 166 (collecting cases). 
 78.  “The people have the right to bear arms for their defense and security; but standing 
armies, in time of peace, are dangerous to liberty, and shall not be kept; and the military shall be in 
strict subordination to the civil power.” OHIO CONST. art. I, § 4. 
 79.  Arnold, 616 N.E.2d at 169. 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  Id. at 171. 
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and did not violate article I, section 4.
82
 
Notwithstanding the Court’s pronouncement in Arnold that it was 
joining the New Judicial Federalism movement,
83
 the occasions on 
which the Court has asserted constitutional independence since Arnold 
have been few and far between. In State v. Robinette, the Court declined 
to hold that the Ohio Constitution gives greater protection against 
searches and seizures than the Fourth Amendment of the federal 
Constitution, even though the Court initially believed that greater 
protection was warranted.
84
 
The question in Robinette I was whether police officers are 
constitutionally required to inform citizens validly detained for a traffic 
offense that they are “free to go” before the officer attempts to engage in 
a consensual interrogation.
85
 The Court initially held that a “free to go” 
statement was required as a matter of both federal and Ohio 
constitutional law.
86
 The state of Ohio appealed this ruling to the United 
States Supreme Court.
87
 The High Court reversed as to the United States 
Constitution, stating that the Fourth Amendment does not require such a 
statement, and that it was reluctant to apply “bright-line” tests in 
determining whether searches are valid.
88
 The Court remanded the case 
back to the Ohio Supreme Court for it to determine whether the 
statement was required solely as a matter of state constitutional law.
89
 
On remand, the Ohio Supreme Court elected to conform Ohio law to 
federal law even though it previously held that such statements were 
required under its interpretation of the federal and Ohio Constitutions.
90
 
Although the Robinette II Court acknowledged the “wave of New 
Federalism,” it narrowed Ohio’s commitment to the movement. The 
Court stated that “where the provisions are similar and no persuasive 
reason for a differing interpretation is presented, this court has 
determined that protections afforded by Ohio’s Constitution are 
coextensive with those provided by the United States Constitution.”91 
The Court concluded that the language of article I, section 14 of the 
 
 82.  Id. at 173. 
 83.  Id. at 169. 
 84.  State v. Robinette, 653 N.E.2d 695 (Ohio 1995) (Robinette I), rev’d, 516 U.S. 1157 
(1996); State v. Robinette, 685 N.E.2d 762 (Ohio 1997) (Robinette II). 
 85.  Robinette I, 653 N.E.2d at 698. 
 86.  Id. at 699. 
 87.  Robinette II, 685 N.E.2d at 765. 
 88.  Id. at 765. 
 89.  Ohio v. Robinette, 516 U.S. 1157, 1157 (1996). 
 90.  Robinette II, 685 N.E.2d at 771. 
 91.  Id. at 766. 
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Ohio Constitution was virtually identical to the Fourth Amendment and 
cited its history of interpreting the Ohio Constitution as affording the 
same, and no greater, protection as the Fourth Amendment.
92
 
The Ohio Supreme Court’s reluctance to robustly embrace Ohio 
constitutional independence has not been limited to search-and-seizure 
cases or even criminal law. In Eastwood Mall, Inc. v. Slanco, the Court 
declined an invitation to construe article I, section 11 of the Ohio 
Constitution more broadly than the First Amendment to the United 
States Constitution in order to protect free speech activities on privately-
owned property open to the public. 
93
 Similarly, in Simmons-Harris v. 
Goff, the Court formally adopted the traditional Lemon v. Kurtzman 
analysis,
94
 used to adjudicate federal Establishment Clause challenges,
95
 
to decide a claim that the state’s school voucher program violated article 
I, section 7 of the Ohio Constitution.
96
 In a nod to state constitutional 
independence, however, the Court stated that it was adopting the Lemon 
test “not because it is the federal constitutional standard, but rather 
because the elements of the Lemon test are a logical and reasonable 
method by which to determine whether a statutory scheme establishes 
religion.”97 The Court “reserve[d] the right to adopt a different 
constitutional standard pursuant to the Ohio Constitution, whether 
because the federal constitutional standard changes or for any other 
relevant reason.”98 
A year later, the Court found a persuasive reason to assert Ohio 
constitutional independence in a religious free exercise case, Humphrey 
v. Lane.
99
 Wendall Humphrey was a Native American employed as a 
 
 92.  Id. While the Robinette I case was on hiatus at the United States Supreme Court, the Ohio 
Supreme Court issued its decision in State ex rel. Wright v. Ohio Adult Parole Bd., 661 N.E.2d 728 
(Ohio 1996). The Court reversed a prior precedent from 1984 which held that under article I, section 
14 of the Ohio Constitution, evidence obtained through an unreasonable or unlawful search and 
seizure is inadmissible in a probation revocation proceeding. In Wright, the Court realigned its 
position to conform to federal Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and the majority Ohio rule that the 
exclusion rule should not apply in probation revocation proceedings. 
 93.  Eastwood Mall, Inc. v. Slanco, 626 N.E.2d 59, 60 (Ohio 1994). 
 94.  Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). 
 95.  “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof.” U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 96.  Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 711 N.E.2d 203, 208 (Ohio 1999) (“All men have a natural and 
indefeasible right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own conscience. No 
person shall be compelled to attend, erect, or support any place of worship, or maintain any form of 
worship, against his consent; and no preference shall be given, by law, to any religious society; nor 
shall any interference with the rights of conscience be permitted.”) 
 97.  Id. at 211. 
 98.  Id. at 212.  
 99.  Humphrey v. Lane, 728 N.E.2d 1039 (Ohio 2000). 
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corrections officer at a state prison.
100
 Humphrey received notice that he 
was to be terminated for refusing to cut his waist-length hair in order to 
comply with a departmental grooming policy.
101
 His refusal to do so was 
based upon his sincerely held religious beliefs - beliefs the department of 
corrections had accommodated for years by allowing him to wear his 
hair tucked neatly under his uniform hat.
102
 Humphrey had no viable 
federal Free Exercise claim because, in 1990, the United States Supreme 
Court had relaxed the standard for such claims by holding that strict 
scrutiny was no longer required.
103
 Humphrey’s only viable choice was 
to bring suit under article I, section 7 of the Ohio Constitution and to 
convince the courts that the Ohio Constitution should continue to follow 
the strict-scrutiny test and afford broader protection to religious freedom 
than the new, federal constitutional floor. 
Humphrey prevailed in the trial court but lost in the court of 
appeals, where the Ninth District predicted that the Ohio Supreme Court 
would transition to the new federal constitutional test and narrow the 
protection afforded to religious free exercise.
104
 The Ohio Supreme 
Court accepted the case for discretionary review and reversed, electing 
to adhere to the long-held strict scrutiny standard, even for challenges to 
generally applicable, religiously neutral laws and regulations, despite the 
recent federal divergence.
105
 The Court analyzed the difference between 
the rich language in article I, section 7 of the Ohio Constitution and the 
abbreviated statement in the First Amendment and concluded that there 
was a qualitative difference: the Ohio Constitution prohibits any 
“interference with the rights of conscience,” while the First Amendment 
concerns itself with laws that prohibit the free exercise of religion.
106
 
Six years later, with Chief Justice O’Connor now a member of the 
Court, Norwood was released. The Court reaffirmed its commitment to 
Ohio’s constitutional independence in Norwood,107 but it did so with 
little fanfare. Perhaps because the United States Supreme Court, in Kelo, 
invited the state legislatures and state supreme courts to afford greater 
 
 100.  Id. at 1041. 
 101.  Id. at 1042. 
 102.  Id. at 1041. 
 103.  The strict scrutiny standard requires a state, seeking to justify a law that infringes upon 
religious freedom, to demonstrate that the law employs the least restrictive means to further a 
compelling state interest. In Emp. Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 872 
(1990), the Court held that a state law did not violate the federal Free Exercise Clause so long as the 
law was religiously neutral and generally applicable. 
 104.  Humphrey, 728 N.E.2d at 1042. 
 105.  Id. at 1043. 
 106.  Id. at 1044. 
 107.  Norwood, 110 Ohio St. 3d 353, 2006-Ohio-3799, 853 N.E.2d 1115, at ¶ 65. 
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protection to individual property rights by restricting public use 
takings,
108
 the Court did not find it necessary to conduct a detailed 
textual analysis (as it had done in Humphrey) or to otherwise justify its 
divergence from the federal reconciliation of property rights and public 
use takings. In effect, Norwood unsettles the presumption that federal 
constitutional law is the dominant law to follow, absent some textually 
based and persuasive reason to make a change. Norwood reinforces the 
role of the Ohio Constitution as a truly independent instrument that may 
be invoked to protect property and other fundamental rights and civil 
liberties. 
C. Judicial Deference Cannot Bleed into Judicial Abdication 
Chief Justice O’Connor came onto the Court at a point in time 
when the Court’s decade-long struggle with the legislature over tort 
reform and school funding had made “judicial activism” a popular 
invective.
109
 Chief Justice O’Connor is a strong advocate of judicial 
restraint and is quick to speak out when she sees the Court stepping out 
from behind the bench or picking up the legislative pen.
110
 Yet, as 
Norwood illustrates, the doctrine of “separation-of-powers,”111 which 
 
 108.  Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 489 (2005). 
 109.  The Court addressed the constitutionality of tort reform legislation six times over a period 
spanning from 1991 to 2007 and, on all but the last occasion, found some aspect of tort reform law 
unconstitutional. See Morris v. Savoy, 576 N.E.2d 765, 768 (Ohio 1991) (holding a cap on general 
damages awarded for medical malpractice unconstitutional); Sorrell v. Thevenir, 633 N.E.2d 504, 
508 (Ohio 1994) (holding the collateral benefits rule unconstitutional); Galayda v. Lake Hosp., 644 
N.E.2d 298, 302 (Ohio 1994) (holding a statute requiring certain awards of tort damages to be 
payable over time unconstitutional); Zoppo v. Homestead Ins. Co., 644 N.E.2d 397, 399 (Ohio 
1994) (holding a statute allowing judge, not jury, to determine punitive damages unconstitutional); 
Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 751 N.E.2d 1062 (Ohio 1999) (striking down Tort Reform Act 
of 1987 in toto); Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson, 116 Ohio St. 3d 468, 2007-Ohio-6948, 880 N.E.2d 
420, at ¶ 8 (upholding caps on non-economic damages and punitive damages enacted in 2005). 
The school funding controversy commanded the Court’s attention from 1997 through 2002, during 
which time the Court held Ohio’s school funding system unconstitutional twice. DeRolph v. State, 
677 N.E.2d 733 (Ohio 1997); DeRolph v. State, 728 N.E.2d 993 (Ohio 2000). In 2001, the Court 
found that changes enacted by the Legislature, with some on-the-spot judicial tweaking, finally 
allowed the system to pass constitutional muster. DeRolph v. State, 754 N.E.2d 1184 (Ohio 2001). 
Nevertheless, in short order, the Court vacated that decision and reinstated the prior holding of 
unconstitutionality. DeRolph v. State, 97 Ohio St. 3d 434, 2002-Ohio-675, 780 N.E.2d 529, at ¶¶ 
10-11. 
 110.  See, e.g., Schussheim v. Schussheim, 137 Ohio St. 3d 133, 2013-Ohio-4529, 998 N.E.2d 
446, at ¶ 18 (O’Connor, C.J., dissenting); State ex rel. Gross v. Indus. Comm’n, 115 Ohio St. 3d 
249, 2007-Ohio-4916, 874 N.E.2d 1162, at ¶ 33 (O’Connor, C.J., dissenting). 
 111.  “The separation-of-powers doctrine requires that each branch of government be permitted 
to exercise its constitutional duties without interference from the other two branches of 
government.” State ex rel. Dann v. Taft, 109 Ohio St. 3d 364, 2006-Ohio-1825, 848 N.E.2d 472, at 
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extols judicial restraint and abhors judicial activism, is a two-way street. 
And when it comes to constitutional interpretation, the Court is indeed 
“Supreme” and has the rightfully dominant role in construing the 
constitutional text, consistent with the separation-of-powers doctrine. 
At its core, Norwood is an opinion about the separation of powers. 
The Court spends considerable time and effort correcting what it viewed 
as the error in cases holding that economic development alone is 
sufficient to satisfy the public use requirement – an “artificial judicial 
deference” to legislative determinations as to what is a sufficient public 
use.
112
 The Court opines that, “[d]espite the relative reluctance of courts 
to intervene in determinations that a sufficient public benefit supported 
the taking, the separation-of-powers doctrine ‘would be unduly 
restricted’ if the state could invoke the police power to virtually 
immunize all takings from judicial review.”113 The opinion succinctly 
captures the difference between the legislative and judicial roles in 
redevelopment takings cases, stating that due deference is rightfully 
given to a legislative factual finding that an area is blighted or 
deteriorated, but that no such deference must be given to a legislative 
determination that eliminating a deteriorating area is a valid public use 
under article I, section 19 of the Ohio Constitution.
114
 
As to the determination of the constitutionality of a taking, rather 
than the need or rationale for the taking, the Court reaffirmed its 
“traditional role as guardian of constitutional rights and limits.”115 The 
Court declared the courts are the sole arbiters of the scope of eminent 
domain appropriations and stated that “[j]udicial review is even more 
imperative in cases in which the taking involves an ensuing transfer of 
property to a private entity, where a novel theory of public use is 
 
¶ 56. “While Ohio, unlike other jurisdictions, does not have a constitutional provision specifying the 
concept of separation of powers, this doctrine is implicitly embedded in the entire framework of 
those sections of the Ohio Constitution that define the substance and scope of powers granted to the 
three branches of state government.” Id. at ¶ 55 (quoting South Euclid v. Jemison, 503 N.E.2d 136, 
137-38 (Ohio 1986)). 
 112.  Norwood, 2006-Ohio-3799 at ¶ 61. Scholarship has similarly criticized the Kelo opinion. 
See Lynda J. Oswald, The Role of Deference in Judicial Review of Public Use Determinations, 39 
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 243, 268-69 (2012); Kristi M. Burkard, Comment, No More Government 
Theft of Property! A Call to Return to A Heightened Standard of Review After the United States 
Supreme Court Decision in Kelo v. City of New London, 27 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 115, 119 
(2005); Ashley J. Fuhrmeister, Note, In the Name of Economic Development: Reviving “Public 
Use” as a Limitation on the Eminent Domain Power in the Wake of Kelo v. City of New London, 
54 DRAKE L. REV. 171, 205 (2005). 
 113.  Norwood, 2006-Ohio-3799 at ¶ 67 (quoting United States ex rel. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. 
Welch, 327 U.S. 546, 556-57 (1946) (Reed, J., concurring)). 
 114.  Id. at ¶ 63. 
 115.  Id. at ¶ 69. 
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asserted, and in cases in which there is a showing of discrimination, bad 
faith, impermissible financial gain, or other improper purpose.”116 In so 
doing, the Court does not make a point of explicitly applying the 
doctrine of separation of powers. Later in the opinion, however, the 
Court takes the doctrine of separation-of-powers head on in a different 
context. 
Ohio’s eminent domain statute contained a provision, R.C. 163.19, 
banning the issuance of stays and injunctions during appellate review of 
an order allowing the taking.
117
 The statute reflects a strong legislative 
preference for assuring the speedy culmination of necessary public 
projects, including demolition projects, by allowing them to proceed 
pending appellate review. The Court, however, held the statute’s no-
stay, anti-injunction provision was “an unconstitutional encroachment on 
the judiciary’s constitutional and inherent authority.”118 
The two discussions of the separation-of-powers doctrine in 
Norwood have significance well beyond the support they give to the 
Court’s case-specific holding. Norwood helps restore the luster of the 
separation-of-powers doctrine after it was tarnished in the era of tort 
reform and school funding debates. Once thought to have become a tool 
for judicial activism, the doctrine of separation of powers is now 
described as the “first, and defining, principle of a free constitutional 
government” and a principle of restraint and respect intended to protect 
the integrity and independence of all three branches of government.
119
 
Chief Justice O’Connor continued the restoration of the doctrine of 
separation of powers in State v. Bodyke.
120
 In that case, the Court struck 
down a provision in the Adam Walsh Act, which required the attorney 
general to reclassify sex offenders who had been classified by court 
order under the prior Megan’s Law.121 The Court held that the provision 
violated the separation-of-powers doctrine because it impermissibly 
instructed the executive branch to review prior judicial decisions.
122
 
Chief Justice O’Connor’s opinion, joined fully by Justices Lundberg 
Stratton and Lanzinger, reviews the purpose of the doctrine as it has 
been viewed over time.
123
 Importantly, however, it also reminds the 
 
 116.  Id. at ¶ 74. 
 117.  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 163.19 (West, Westlaw through Files 1 to 140 and Statement 
Issue 1of the 130th GA (2013-2014)). 
 118.  Norwood, 2006-Ohio-3799 at ¶ 125. 
 119.  State v. Bodyke, 126 Ohio St. 3d 266, 2010-Ohio-2424, 933 N.E.2d 753, at ¶ 39. 
 120.  Id. at ¶¶ 39-54. 
 121.  Id. at ¶¶ 60-61. 
 122.  Id. at ¶ 60. 
 123.  Id. at ¶¶ 39-53. 
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public, and perhaps the courts, that the Court’s vigilance in protecting 
the separation of powers “is not borne of self-reverence” but rather is 
necessary to “protect the borders separating the three branches in order 
to ensure the security and harmony of the government.”124 
The Bodyke opinion not only draws favorably on Norwood but also, 
surprisingly, on the Court’s controversial opinion in Ohio Academy of 
Trial Lawyers v. Sheward.
125
 Sheward was at the epicenter of the 
firestorm over tort reform and was branded by some as a case of extreme 
judicial activism because of its invocation of a novel form of public 
interest standing to allow trial lawyers to seek an immediate review, and 
invalidation, of tort reform legislation by the Ohio Supreme Court.
126
 By 
citing Sheward as well as Norwood, Chief Justice O’Connor helped put 
the Court’s past behind it and soothe the controversy that had 
surrounded the separation-of-powers doctrine. 
The opinion reminds us that the judiciary “has both the power and 
the solemn duty to determine the constitutionality and validity of acts by 
other branches of government” and that courts must “‘jealously guard 
the judicial power against encroachment from the other two branches of 
government and . . . conscientiously perform our constitutional duties 
and continue our most precious legacy.’”127 Through Norwood and 
Bodyke, Chief Justice O’Connor has made clear that the separation of 
powers is not simply about judicial power or judicial restraint but also 
focuses on mutual respect for the proper and necessary roles of all three 
branches of government. 
D. The Counterpoise of Judicial Restraint is Legislative Clarity 
Having decided that an economic or financial benefit alone is 
insufficient to satisfy the public use requirement, the Court turned to the 
question of whether the takings could be justified based on the finding 
that the Horneys’ neighborhood was a “deteriorating area” or whether 
that term was too vague as a takings standard.
128
 Norwood’s treatment of 
 
 124.  Id. at ¶ 47. 
 125. Id. at ¶ 43 (quoting summary of separation of powers from Sheward majority opinion). 
 126.  See, e.g., Jonathan I. Blake, Note, State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. 
Sheward: The Extraordinary Application of Extraordinary Writs and Other Issues; The Case That 
Never Should Have Been, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 433, 434 (“The majority in State ex rel. Ohio 
Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward moved jurisdictional and procedural mountains to address the 
unjusticiable issue of tort reform. In so doing, Ohio’s highest court egregiously ignored well-
established jurisdictional rules laid down by the court itself, decades of procedural formalities, and a 
stream of consistent case law dating back to colonial America.”). 
 127.  Bodyke, 2010-Ohio-2424 at ¶ 46. 
 128.  Norwood, 110 Ohio St. 3d 353, 2006-Ohio-3799, 853 N.E.2d 1115, at ¶¶ 90-104. 
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the property owners’ separate void-for-vagueness claim is also 
noteworthy.
129
 
The void-for-vagueness doctrine is a well-accepted principle of due 
process that demands “the state provide meaningful standards in its 
laws.”130 Its purpose is to ensure that the citizenry has fair notice of the 
conduct proscribed and that laws will not be arbitrarily enforced.
131
 The 
doctrine, however, is rarely invoked successfully. The Ohio Supreme 
Court has reviewed void-for-vagueness claims in only 58 cases,
132
 and it 
has held a state law or municipal ordinance unconstitutionally vague in 
only nine cases. Seven of these cases involved criminal statutes or 
ordinances.
133
 Prior to Norwood, the Court struck down a civil law on 
vagueness grounds only once.
134
 
Norwood recognizes that the vagueness doctrine is usually applied 
in criminal law or First Amendment cases but holds that “neither the 
rationale underlying the doctrine nor the case law interpreting it suggests 
that it should not be applied in any case in which the statute challenged 
substantially affects other fundamental constitutional rights.”135 The 
Court also holds that a more stringent or heightened test for vagueness 
will apply when a legislative enactment affects a constitutionally 
protected right, rather than merely economic or non-fundamental 
interests.
136
 
Applying a heightened standard of review, the Court found that the 
City ordinance was unconstitutionally vague in its effort to assert the 
power of eminent domain over “deteriorating areas.”137 The Court 
acknowledged that the Norwood Code set forth a “fairly comprehensive 
array of conditions that purport to describe a ‘deteriorating area’” but 
 
 129.  Id. at ¶ 81. 
 130.  Id. 
 131.  Id. 
 132.  As revealed by a Lexis search using “void w/10 vague!”. 
 133.  See City of Akron v. Rowland, 618 N.E.2d 138, 148-49 (Ohio 1993) (municipal loitering 
ordinance); City of South Euclid v. Richardson, 551 N.E.2d 606, 606 (Ohio 1990) (ordinance 
prohibiting brothels); City of Columbus v. New, 438 N.E.2d 1155, 1155 (Ohio 1982) (falsification 
ordinance); State v. Young, 406 N.E.2d 499, 500 (Ohio 1980) (organized crime statute); City of 
Columbus v. Rogers, 324 N.E.2d 563, 563 (Ohio 1973) (ordinance prohibiting cross dressing); City 
of Cincinnati v. Taylor, 303 N.E.2d 886, 887 (Ohio 1973) (anti-prowling ordinance); Dragelevich v. 
City of Youngstown, 197 N.E.2d 334, 334 (Ohio 1964) (prohibition on exhibiting gambling 
machinery). 
 134.  State ex rel. Miller v. Brown, 150 N.E.2d 46, 48 (Ohio 1958) (holding state election 
statute unconstitutional because it was “so confused, vague, unworkable and discriminatory that it 
amounted to no effective legislation”). 
 135.  Norwood, 110 Ohio St. 3d 353, 2006-Ohio-3799, 853 N.E.2d 1115, at ¶ 87. 
 136.  Id. at ¶ 88. 
 137.  Id. at ¶ 104. 
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noted that the described conditions – e.g., incompatible land uses, lack 
of adequate parking, faulty street arrangement, obsolete platting, small 
front yards – “are endemic to urban neighborhoods, including some of 
the most exclusive in America, e.g. Beacon Hill in Boston, Greenwich 
Village and Tribeca in lower Manhattan and Nob Hill in San 
Francisco.”138 In the end, the Court concluded that the Norwood Code’s 
definition of a “deteriorating area” was a “standardless standard” that 
“offer[ed] so little guidance in its application that it is almost barren of 
any practical meaning.”139 
The new life Norwood gives to the void-for-vagueness doctrine is 
consistent with the opinion’s earlier views on the scope of judicial 
review and separation of powers. In essence, the Court recognized that 
the quid pro quo for judicial restraint is legislative precision. Although 
the Court is committed to enforcing statutes and ordinances as written, 
the legislative standard must be clear, especially where the law impacts 
fundamental rights that could be lost through arbitrary enforcement. 
While Norwood has not, and likely will not, spark a new trend of 
successful vagueness challenges, it may have a palliative effect on 
legislative efforts to curtail fundamental civil rights and a positive effect 
on the clarity of new laws and regulations in all areas. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Chief Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Norwood is significant, 
without more, for its resolution of legally and emotionally charged 
question regarding the reach of the power of eminent domain. This case 
about taking, however, gives us much more. In Norwood, Chief Justice 
O’Connor and the Court deliver an important, modern recalibration of 
fundamental principles of Ohio constitutional analysis. Thus, the broader 
significance of Norwood lies in its strong affirmation of New Judicial 
Federalism and the importance of the Ohio Constitution as an 
independent source of possible greater protection of fundamental rights, 
its firm articulation of the separation of powers doctrine rooted in the 
doctrine’s importance to free constitutional governance, and its 
expansion of the void-for-vagueness doctrine to protect fundamental 
rights in a civil context not involving free speech. 
 
 
 138.  Id. at ¶ 93 n.13. 
 139.  Id. at ¶¶ 97-98. 
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